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The Rescue of American International Group
Module F: The AIG Credit Facility Trust1
Alec Buchholtz2 and Aidan Lawson3
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
February 19, 2020, revised: April 15, 2021
Abstract
In September 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) experienced a liquidity crisis.
To avoid the insurance giant’s bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)
extended an $85 billion emergency secured credit facility to AIG. In connection with the
credit facility, AIG issued 100,000 shares of preferred stock, with voting rights equal to and
convertible into 79.9% of the outstanding shares of AIG common stock, to an independent
trust (the Trust) set up by the FRBNY. Three trustees held the stock for the sole benefit of
the US Treasury, exercised the rights, powers, authorities, discretions, and duties of the
preferred stock, and acted as the beneficial owner of AIG. On January 14, 2011, the Trust
converted the preferred stock into AIG common stock, and, after transferring the common
stock to the Treasury’s General Fund, the Trust effectively dissolved. Over the next two years,
Treasury sold the common stock in a series of six public offerings returning a profit to the
government. The government’s equity investment and the Trust were controversial, raising
debate about nationalization, transparency, and independence of the Trustees.
Keywords: AIG, credit facility, equity, liquidity, preferred stock, trust, voting rights
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1

•

“The Rescue of American International Group, Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility” by Lily S.
Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, and Devyn Jeffereis. 2021.

•

“The Rescue of American International Group, Module C: AIG Investment Program” by Alec Buchholtz
and Aidan Lawson. 2021.

•

“The Rescue of American International Group, Module D: Maiden Lane II” by Lily S. Engbith and Devyn
Jeffereis. 2021.

•

“The Rescue of American International Group, Module E: Maiden Lane III” by Lily S. Engbith and Devyn
Jeffereis. 2021.

•

“The Rescue of American International Group, Module F: The AIG Credit Facility Trust” by Alec
Buchholtz and Aidan Lawson. 2021.

•

“The Rescue of American International Group, Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z Wiggins, Aidan
Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, and Andrew Metrick. 2021.

Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
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American International Group, Inc.:
The AIG Credit Facility Trust
At a Glance
On September 22, 2008, American
International Group, Inc. (AIG) signed a
Credit Agreement with the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to
access an $85 billion emergency credit
line, the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF),
secured by AIG’s assets, including
equity interests in its insurance and
other subsidiaries. AIG was also to sell
to the government 100,000 shares of
AIG Series C perpetual, convertible,
participating preferred stock, which
had dividend and voting rights equal to,
and was convertible into, 79.9% of
AIG’s outstanding common shares. The
preferred shares were to be held and
managed for “the sole benefit of the
Treasury” by an independent trust,
overseen by three trustees (the
Trustees) appointed by the FRBNY in
consultation with the US Treasury
Department. The Trustees were
authorized to exercise all “rights,
powers, authorities, discretions, and
duties” of the preferred stock.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To “establish an independent trust for the sole
benefit of the Treasury,” to act as the beneficial owner of
AIG, and to create a divestiture plan for the sale or
disposition of the preferred stock
Announcement Date

September 22, 2008

Establishment Date

January 16, 2009

Dissolution Date

January 14, 2011

Beneficiary

US Treasury General Fund

No. of Trustees

3

Trustees Compensation

$100,000 + expenses

Funder of Trust

AIG

No. of Shares Managed

100,000

Class of Shares Managed

Series C perpetual,
convertible, participating
preferred stock

Share Issuance Date

March 4, 2009

Share Conversion Date

January 14, 2011

Shares Issued on
Conversion

562,868,096 common stock
shares

$500,000, plus FRBNY
On March 4, 2009, AIG sold the shares Consideration
lending commitment
(the Trust Stock) to the Trust for
$500,000. The Trust Stock could be Liquidation Preference
$500,000 in aggregate
converted only after termination of the
RCF, which could terminate only after repayment of all amounts due under the Credit
Agreement.

Upon the execution of AIG’s Recapitalization Plan on January 14, 2011, AIG repaid the
remaining balance under the RCF to the FRBNY, terminating the Credit Agreement. This
permitted the Trust to convert the Trust Stock into 563 million shares of common stock and
transfer such stock to the Treasury Department, subsequently dissolving the Trust. The
common stock received from the conversion of the Trust Stock, plus other AIG common
shares that it held, were gradually sold off by the Treasury Department through late 2012.
Summary Evaluation
The FRBNY designed the Trust to be independent, because FRBNY officials concluded that
the FRBNY did not have the legal authority to own and control a large private company. Still,
some members of Congress and others criticized the Trust’s design as opaque and
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questioned its role. Over the Trust’s lifespan, the Trustees nominated and elected 11 of AIG’s
13-member board of directors. The Trustees met regularly during 2010 to discuss a
divestiture plan for the Trust Stock and worked alongside a Government Repayment
Committee composed of AIG outside directors.
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American International Group: United States Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
Sovereign credit rating (Fiveyear senior debt)

$14,681.5 billion in 2007
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
$47,976 in 2007
$48,383 in 2008
As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:

Five-bank concentration of
banking system

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
62.9% in 2007
68.3% in 2008
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial
system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial
system in 2008
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008

Foreign involvement in banking
system

22% of total banking assets in 2007
18% of total banking assets in 2008

Government ownership of
banking system

0% of banks owned by the state in 2008

Existence of deposit insurance

100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for
2008

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking system as a
percentage of financial system

Source: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank,
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Overview

Background
In the midst of the financial crisis in 2008, American International Group (AIG), one of the
largest insurance companies in the world, faced a liquidity crisis and multibillion-dollar
losses on its mortgage-linked products and investments.4 The Federal Reserve Board voted
to invoke Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to enable the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (FRBNY) to mitigate AIG’s liquidity woes by announcing the Revolving Credit
Facility (RCF) on September 16, 2008. The RCF was an $85 billion, two-year loan
commitment secured by AIG’s assets, including interests in its domestic and foreign
insurance subsidiaries. The Fed said that the government would take a 79.9% equity interest
in AIG (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2008; FRBNY 2008b, Sec. 2.04[a], 40).
The following week, the Fed and AIG signed the Credit Agreement establishing the RCF; this
included further details about the structure and governance of the government’s equity
stake. First, the government was to receive 100,000 shares of convertible participating
preferred stock (the Trust Stock), convertible into a number of common shares equal to
79.9% of the shares then outstanding or reserved for issuance5 (FRBNY 2008b, Sec. 5.11,
Exhibit D). (See also Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a.) After deciding on preferred stock as the
method of its equity stake, the government subsequently determined that it should create an
independent trust (the Trust) to manage its investment in AIG (YPFS 2018; Wiggins et al.
2021). The Trust Stock carried voting and dividend rights proportionate to its convertible
share of common stock (originally 79.9%),6 effectively giving the Trust control over the
company (FRBNY 2008b, Sec. 5.11, Exhibit D).
The Trust was established “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, and disposing of the Trust
Stock,” the issuance of which was “intended to provide compensation for the assumption of
the risks arising from the Credit Agreement and to reduce those risks” (FRBNY 2009a, 1).
According to the FRBNY’s September 29, 2008 press release, the Trust Stock also “ha[d] the
potential to provide a substantial financial return to the American people,” so long as the RCF
_____________________________________________________________________
4

These were credit default swap contracts sold by its Financial Products division that were exposed to the
U.S. housing market and investments purchased with proceeds from its Securities Lending practice.
(Congressional Oversight Panel 2010, pp. 7, 24, fn 21.)
The series of the Trust Stock was not originally designated. However, after Treasury purchased a separate
class of AIG preferred stock using Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds in November 2008, the
preferred stock was then deemed Series C perpetual, convertible, participating preferred stock and ranked
junior to the newly purchased Series D TARP preferred stock (FRBNY 2008a).
5

6

While the Trust Stock was originally designed to be convertible into 79.9% of AIG’s common stock, in
November 2008, the terms of the Trust Stock were amended to decrease the convertibility to approximately
77.9% of AIG’s common stock (FRBNY 2008a, Sec. 6; AIG 2008a). This change was made to adjust for a
November 2008 investment by Treasury whereby it purchased $40 billion (4 million shares) of Series D
preferred stock and also received a 10-year warrant to purchase 2% of AIG’s outstanding common stock (AIG
2008a). The Trust Stock was adjusted to keep the government’s potential ownership under 80%, the level at
which it would have to consolidate AIG onto the government’s balance sheet.
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provided AIG with adequate support to sustain itself (FRBNY 2008c). (See Buchholtz and
Lawson 2021a for more information on terms of the Credit Agreement.)
Program Description
Consistent with the Credit Agreement and pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated January 16,
2009, the FRBNY established the Trust to receive, hold, and manage the Trust Stock (FRBNY
2009a, Preamble). The Trust Agreement stated that the trust was “designated as the AIG
Credit Facility Trust for the sole benefit of the Treasury, which, for the avoidance of doubt,
means that any property distributable to the Treasury as a beneficiary hereunder shall be
paid to the Treasury for deposit into the General Fund as miscellaneous receipts” (FRBNY
2009a, Sec. 1.01, 2). The Trust was revocable only by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
(FRBNY 2009a, Sec. 1.03, 2–3).
The Trustees were appointed by the FRBNY, in consultation with Treasury, on the basis of
their having “integrity, impeccable reputations in the marketplace, and a unique
combination of experience successfully leading major corporations and working in the
public sector” (FRBNY 2010a). Trustees could resign on 60 days’ notice and the FRBNY, in
consultation with the Treasury, could appoint successor Trustees (FRBNY 2009a, 11). A
Trustee could also be removed by the other Trustees, in consultation with the FRBNY, if they
unanimously determined that “replacement of such Trustee [was] in the best interests of the
Trust” (FRBNY 2009a, 11).
The Trust Agreement contained a number of provisions designed to maintain its
independence. These included provisions (i) giving the Trustees “absolute discretion and
control over the Trust Stock including how to exercise the voting rights, (ii) limiting the
Trustees ability to elect FRBNY affiliates to the AIG board, and (iii) stating that the Trustees
were not relieved from exercising their independent judgement despite receiving
information from the FRNY. (Starr v. FRBNY 2012, 9-10).7
The process of vetting potential trustees began in October 2008, although the Trust was not
formally established until January 2009 (HOGRC 2009, 52-53; FRBNY 2009a, 1). The initial
three Trustees are identified in Figure 1.

_____________________________________________________________________
7

The court also held that Delaware fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal law as upholding it would
have interfered with FRBNY performing its duties. (Engelmayer 2012). The decision was upheld by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (See Walker 2014).
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Figure 1: Original Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust
Trustee Name

Previous Positions
Chairman of the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation
Chairman of Barclays Americas
Chair of the Board of Directors of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Houston Branch, and
Central Houston, Inc.

Jill M. Considine
Chester B. Feldberg
Douglas L. Foshee

Sources: FRBNY 2009a; FRBNY 2010b.

Each trustee was paid an annual compensation of $100,000, with costs and expenses
reimbursed (FRBNY 2009a, Sec. 3.04(a), 13). To fund the Trust’s operations, AIG deposited
$100,000 into a deposit account and was obligated to continue to fund the costs of the Trust
(FRBNY 2009a, Sec. 3.04(b), 3.03(e). 13-14).
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement, the purpose of the Trust was to vote the held
stock, develop and execute a plan to sell or dispose of the Trust’s stock, and work with AIG
senior management and its board of directors to ensure that corporate governance
procedures were met satisfactorily and in the best interest of Treasury and the taxpayers
during the time of the government’s assistance to AIG (FRBNY 2009a, 3–10). To this end, the
Trustees met regularly with Government Repayment Committee (GRC), a committee formed
in April 2010 by AIG’s board of directors, composed only of outside directors and charged
with monitoring and repayment of the government assistance (AIG 2010c).
The Trust Agreement required the Trustees to “develop a written plan (the Divestiture Plan)
for the sale or other disposition of the Trust Stock” (FRBNY 2009a, 8). To create and execute
the Divestiture Plan, the Trust Agreement directed the Trustees to consider (FRBNY 2009a,
Sec. 2.05, 8):
1. The effect of any sale or disposition of [Series C preferred stock] on any repayments
owed to the FRBNY or Treasury;
2. The impact of any conversion of AIG preferred stock to AIG common stock on antidilution features that affect the Trust (specific to equity units purchased by Bank of
New York in May 2008);
3. The financial condition of AIG;
4. The impact of any sale or disposition of [Series C preferred stock] on general
financial market conditions;
5. Obtaining full and adequate consideration for the [Series C preferred stock];
6. The best interests of Treasury.
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To help administer the Trust, the Trustees were authorized to hire (and lease office space
for) professional advisers and agents as well as administrative, secretarial, and clerical staff
(FRBNY 2009a, 5).
AIG issued the Trust Stock to the Trust on March 4, 2009, as described in more detail in the
“Outcomes” section of this case. The Trust Stock had a perpetual term length and was subject
to anti-dilution provisions (FRBNY 2008b, Exhibit D). Because of an investment by Treasury
in November 2008, which included Treasury’s receiving a warrant to purchase up to 2% of
AIG’s outstanding common stock, the convertibility of the Trust Stock on issuance had been
adjusted downward to equal 77.9% of AIG’s common stock (GAO 2009, 37 - 38). According
to the Trust Agreement, the Trustees had the right to vote the Trust Stock and had the ability
to “exercise all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of a stockholder of the company,” which
included converting the Trust Stock to AIG common stock (FRBNY 2009a, 6).
Since AIG had 5 billion authorized shares of common stock at the time the Trust Stock was
issued and 3 billion shares were already issued, the Trust would have been only able to
acquire 2 billion, or 40%, of AIG common stock. (AIG 2009b, B-2). Thus, an increase of the
amount of authorized but unissued shares of common stock was necessary for the Trust to
receive the full 77.9% of common stock required by the Credit Agreement (FRBNY 2009a,
1). Further, the Trustees were directed in the Trust Agreement to vote for certain proposals
that would have facilitated making sufficient shares available to support conversion8
(FRBNY 2009a, 6).
Outcomes
The Trust acquired the Trust Shares on March 4, 2009 (AIG 2009a). Upon obtaining the Trust
Stock, the Trust received the ability to exercise the voting rights and powers attached to the
shares, which included receiving any declared dividend payments and converting the
preferred stock to common stock (AIG 2009a, Sec. 2[a]). The conversion could only occur
after the RCF was repaid and the adequate amount of authorized AIG common stock became
available, which was the case after the 2009 Annual Meeting (AIG 2009c).
Following the purchase, the Trust began to develop the Divestiture Plan for the Trust Stock,
but as far as we have been able to determine, the plan was likely abandoned or not executed
once the Treasury took over the stock.

_____________________________________________________________________
8

These provisions were to:
• Increase the number of authorized shares of AIG common stock from 5 billion to 19 billion
(decreasing the value from $2.50 to $0.000001 per share) and increase the number of authorized
shares of AIG preferred stock from 6 million to 13 billion (decreasing the value from $5.00 to
$0.00004 per share);
• Amend AIG’s Certificate of Incorporation to change the conversion ratio to equal the quotient from
dividing the number of underlying shares before the amendment by the number of underlying shares
after the amendment and make the liquidating preference of Series C preferred stock to be $500,000
divided by the number of underlying shares (FRBNY 2009a, Section 2.04).
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After the termination of the Credit Agreement, the Trust converted the Trust Stock to AIG
common stock and transferred such shares to the Treasury General Fund (FRBNY 2011).
Treasury gradually sold the stock publicly, aggregating it with the other AIG shares that it
held (FRBNY 2011). After accounting for all AIG common stock sold, Treasury recorded net
proceeds of roughly $53 billion from the offerings, resulting in a $4.1 billion gain (Treasury
2012). More specifically, the 563 million shares of AIG common stock resulting from the
conversion of the Trust Stock accounted for gross cash proceeds of nearly $17.6 billion
(Treasury et al. 2010; Webel 2017, 4).
All three trustees were present at a May 13, 2009 House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee (HOGRC) hearing, where they testified regarding the public rescue of AIG and the
details of the Trust (HOGRC 2009). The HOGRC examined the Trust’s relationship with AIG,
the FRBNY, and Treasury, as well as the trustees’ role in managing the Trust Stock and how
they were exercising the powers of said stock.
At the AIG Annual Meeting of Shareholders held on June 25, 2009, the Trust voted on 10 of
11 proposals presented to shareholders,9 including a proposal authorizing a 20-to-1 reverse
stock split of AIG common shares (AIG 2010a). This proposal reduced the number of
outstanding AIG shares from approximately 3 billion to 150 million (Starr v. United States
and AIG 2012, 8). Since there were 4.85 billion shares of AIG common stock authorized but
unissued, the effect of the proposal was to make possible the conversion of the Trust Stock
(Starr v. United States and AIG 2012, 8).
During 2009 and 2010, in consultation with the FRBNY, the Trust nominated and elected
several new members to AIG’s board of directors. Following AIG’s 2010 Annual Meeting, 11
of AIG’s then 13-member board were persons nominated by the Trust (Starr v. United States
and AIG , 8). However, in the interest of avoiding conflicts of interests and maintaining the
independence of the Trust the Trust agreement provided that no current or person who had
been an employee of the FRBNY within the last year could be nominated as a director.
The Trust collaborated with the Government Repayment Committee (GRC), which met
weekly, and participated in the negotiations between AIG and the government to help the
two parties find an adequate exit strategy from the relationship between them (AIG 2010c).
These discussions eventually resulted in the Recapitalization Plan entered into on
September 30, 201010 (AIG 2010c).

_____________________________________________________________________
The proposal that the Trust did not vote on pursuant to a prearranged agreement not to vote due to a court
challenge, would have made available enough authorized, but unissued common AIG stock to enable the
government to convert the Trust Stock into 77.9% of AIG common stock (Trust Agreement, 1). Ultimately, the
shares needed for conversion were achieved through a reverse stock split.
9

For discussion of the Recapitalization Plan, which provided for a restructuring of the government’s
assistance to AIG, including, inter alia, the repayment of the RCF and conversion of the Trust Stock to common
stock, see Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a.
10
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As part of the Recapitalization Plan, AIG on January 14, 2011, fully repaid the FRBNY the
outstanding balance under the RCF, effectively terminating the Credit Agreement (Webel
2017, 15). On this same day, the Trust converted the Trust Stock into nearly 563 million
shares of AIG common stock and transferred the newly issued common stock to the US
Treasury General Fund, thereby dissolving the Trust11 (FRBNY 2011; Starr v. United States
and AIG , 16).
Over the next two years, through December 2012, Treasury disposed of the AIG common
stock through a series of six public offerings (Treasury 2012). Treasury reported net
proceeds from the stock offerings of more than $51.6 billion, a $4.1 billion positive return
for taxpayers (Treasury 2012). (See also Buchholtz and Lawson 2021b for more information
on the disposition of AIG common stock by Treasury.)

II.

Key Design Decisions

1.
The AIG Trust was created as part of a multi-faceted intervention by the
government.
The AIG Trust was created to hold Trust Stock, which was issued to the government in
connection with the FRBNY’s entering into the $85 billion RCF with AIG in September 2008
to address its severe liquidity needs (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2008). The RCF
was the first of a series of government interventions for AIG over a number of years (Webel
2017; Wiggins et al. 2021). Interventions were funded by the FRBNY and Treasury; included
loans, asset purchases, and capital investments; and became the government’s largest
intervention for any one entity to date, totaling $182.3 billion (Treasury 2013, 14).
2.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York established the Trust pursuant to
Section 13(3) and Section 4(4) of the Federal Reserve Act.
The RCF was established on September 16, 2008. After some deliberation, the FRBNY settled
on the creation of a Trust to hold a 79.9% (later amended to 77.9%) equity interest in AIG
received in connection with the Credit Facility (Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 20–26;
FRBNY 2009a, 1). Section 13(3) specified that, “in unusual or exigent circumstances,” the
Federal Reserve could provide emergency liquidity to an institution that was unable to
adequately acquire it from private markets. Section 4(4)’s incidental powers provisions
permits the Fed to undertake actions incidental to exercising it other powers. (Starr v. United
States and AIG 2017, 14-22).

_____________________________________________________________________
Upon receipt of the shares resulting from conversion of the Trust Stock, and following the Recapitalization,
Treasury held more than 1.6 billion shares of AIG common stock equal to approximately 92.1% ownership in
AIG and consolidated on the government’s balance sheet. (Treasury 2011). For details on the other preferred
stock Treasury purchased through various TARP investments in AIG, please refer to Buchholtz and Lawson
2021c.
11

186

The Rescue of American International Group Module F

Buchholtz and Lawson

3.
The Trust was monitored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, though the
Trust remained independent and existed “for the sole benefit of the United States
Treasury.”
According to the Credit Agreement for the RCF, a preferred stock investment was to be issued
to a Trust established for the benefit of the United States Treasury (FRBNY 2008b, Exhibit
D). The later executed Trust Agreement clarified that the Trust was established for the “sole”
benefit of the Treasury, and explained that, “for the avoidance of doubt, [sole benefit] means
that any property distributable to the Treasury as a beneficiary hereunder shall be paid to
the Treasury for deposit into the General Fund as miscellaneous receipts” (FRBNY 2009a).
The Trust’s three trustees were to be appointed by the FRBNY in consultation with Treasury
(FRBNY 2009a, 2).
The Trust Stock itself was held in a “securities account” at a commercial bank selected by
FRBNY (FRBNY 2009a, 3). However, the Trustees had sole access. FRBNY had no ownership
interest in any of the Trust Stock or other assets (FRBNY 2009a, 4). The Trustees also had
access to a deposit account with a balance of $100,000 to be used for any compensation and
expenses needed to facilitate the operations of the Trust (FRBNY 2009a, 14). Should the
balance fall below $25,000, AIG was required to inject enough funds to increase the balance
to $100,000 (FRBNY 2009a, 14). In addition to these accounts, the Trustees could hire “fulltime and part-time administrative, secretarial, and clerical staff,” as well as lease or sublease
office space needed to perform their duties (FRBNY 2009a, 5). Any litigation efforts against
the Trust would be fought and paid for by FRBNY, though it would be reimbursed for these
efforts by the Trust, if needed (FRBNY 2009a, 10).
Last, Section 4.01 of the Trust Agreement mandated that the Trustees meet with FRBNY on
at least a quarterly basis to “discuss the administration of the Trust and other topics of
interest to the parties” (FRBNY 2009a, 17). The same section also required the Trust to
provide FRBNY with the following reports (FRBNY 2009a, 17–18):
1. “Monthly custodial reports;
2. Quarterly summary of significant actions (votes, consents, etc.);
3. Quarterly reports summarizing the efforts and activities to effect the sale or other
disposition of the Trust Stock or other Trust Assets;
4. Minutes of any meetings of the Trustees; and
5. The Divestiture Plan, as amended from time to time by the Trustees.”
A number of provisions of the Trust Agreement were designed to ensure the Trust’s
independence, including provisions (i) giving the Trustees “absolute discretion and control
over the Trust Stock including how to exercise the voting rights, (ii) limiting the Trustees
ability to elect FRBNY affiliates to the AIG board, and (iii) stating that the Trustees were not
relieved from exercising their independent judgement despite receiving information from
the FRNY. (Starr v. FRBNY 2012, 9-10)
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4.
The Trust was communicated as an independent vehicle for the interests of the
Treasury and the taxpayers.
The Federal Reserve’s first press release regarding the RCF, dated September 16, 2008,
explicitly mentions that in connection therewith, “The U.S. government will receive a 79.9
percent equity interest in AIG” (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2008). However, the
Fed and Treasury had not yet worked out the details of the structure or governance of the
equity interest (FRBNY 2008b). The Fed and AIG signed the Credit Agreement and Pledge
Agreements on September 22, 2008, and AIG released those agreements publicly in a Form
8-K filed with the SEC on September 26, 2008, which specified the trust as a part of the
agreement.12
It was only on January 16, 2009, that the FRBNY issued a press release on the creation of the
Trust (FRBNY 2009b). In addition to naming the Trustees, the press release specified that,
“the Trust has been structured so that the New York Fed cannot exercise any discretion or
control over the voting and consent rights associated with the equity interest in AIG” (FRBNY
2009b). Approximately a week later, the FRBNY posted the executed Trustee Agreement
providing further information about the Trust’s structure and guidelines (FRBNY 2010d).
In an effort to better explain the purposes of the Trust and the roles and responsibilities of
the Trustees, the three Trustees testified before the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform on May 13, 2009. The purpose of the hearing, as expressed by Chairman
Edolphus Towns of New York, was to investigate “the shroud of secrecy that has blanketed
the entire sequence of [the AIG collapse and the government’s actions]” and to provide
answers about the use of funds, AIG’s long-term goals, and protection of the taxpayers’
interest (HOGRC 2009). This hearing followed significant backlash that AIG received for
paying out millions of dollars in bonuses to some of the same executives that were
instrumental in AIG’s difficulties. The most recent set of payments, revealed the week before
the hearing, totaled about $454 million (HOGRC 2009).
The Trustees spoke at length about their ability to influence the upper-level management of
AIG by “ensuring that AIG has the best, most qualified, independent board of directors that
it can have.” They were able to nominate members to the board and, as of date of the hearing,
they had nominated five new candidates to the board and anticipated that they would all be
approved (HOGRC 2009). Following the 2010 shareholders’ meeting, the Trustees would
have nominated and voted for 11 of AIG’s then 13-membe board.

_____________________________________________________________________
12

The 8-K is a summation. References to the Trust in total are these (AIG 2008b):
“The Credit Facility contains customary affirmative and negative covenants, including a
requirement to maintain a minimum amount of liquidity and a requirement to use reasonable efforts
to cause the composition of the Board of Directors of AIG to be satisfactory to the trust described
below within 10 days after the establishment of the trust.
Under the agreement, AIG will issue a new series of perpetual, non-redeemable Convertible
Participating Serial Preferred Stock (the “Preferred Stock”) to a trust that will hold the Preferred
Stock for the benefit of the United States Treasury.”
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In other testimony and interviews, the Trustees, repeatedly discussed how seriously they
took their fiduciary duties to the Trust. See for example Feldberg 2019.
5.
The FRBNY established the Trust because it did not have legal authority to own
shares in AIG directly and to protect the taxpayers’ investment.
As additional consideration for the RCF, AIG issued the Trust Stock to the Trust. (FRBNY
2009a, 2). In September 2008, neither the Treasury nor FRBNY had the authority to own a
controlling equity interest in the company, and thus the Trust was a viable solution to this
limitation. The establishment of the Trust was “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, and
disposing of the Trust Stock,” the issuance of which was “intended to provide compensation
for the assumption of the risks arising from the Credit Agreement and to reduce those risks”
(Trust Agreement - Preamble). If the government assistance to AIG was successful and AIG
was able to restructure itself, its stock price would likely increase. Rather than have all that
value, funded by the government’s lifeline, go only to private stockholders, the Trust Stock
would ensure that the taxpayers also received some of that benefit, which they ultimately
did to the amount of $17.6 billion dollars of profit (Geithner 2014, 196–197; Webel 2017).
Although criticized by some AIG stockholders and others, “the terms of the Federal Reserve
credit [including the requirement for the Trust Stock] were modeled on terms prepared for
a private sector lender that ultimately decided not to take the risk of lending to AIG after
Lehman failed” (Alvarez and Dudley 2018, 19).
Establishment of the Trust was deemed necessary by Fed counsel because although Section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act gave the Federal Reserve the authority to lend to a private
company, it did not, nor did any other authority, allow the FRBNY to own a controlling equity
interest and act as a shareholder in a company (Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 59–60).
The Fed also considered “gifting” the Trust Stock to Treasury, and having it own the shares,
but the Treasury only felt it could receive the shares this way if the Fed used a trust; Treasury
also lacked the authority to hold voting stock in AIG13 (YPFS 2018).
These conclusions were testified to in a later lawsuit brought by AIG shareholders
challenging the Fed’s ownership as summarized by the court in its 2015 decision (Starr v.
United States and AIG 2015, 60):
“The legal staffs of FRBNY and the Federal Reserve acknowledged that they could
not obtain or hold equity, or acquire voting control, of a commercial entity. FRBNY’s
general counsel, Mr. [Thomas] Baxter, noted during an interview on May 11, 2010:
_____________________________________________________________________
13

According to Scott Alvarez, Federal Reserve Board General Counsel at the time, Treasury was restricted by
the fact that no funds had been appropriated for the purchase of AIG shares (YPFS 2018). The Anti-Deficiency
Act states that “an officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia
government may not… (B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money
before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law” (Government Publishing Office 2007b).
Additionally, after its passage in October 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA),
provided a basis for the Treasury to hold the shares (YPFS 2018).
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Neither the Fed nor the [T]reasury had authority to hold the shares. When
we saw equity on term sheet—problem of legal ownership and the conflict.
Maybe strike that and not take equity. But then thought of taxpayer. Create a
trust, put shares in trust. For benefit of American people. We had to decide
that right away.
. . . Mr. Baxter notified the Board of Governors’ counsel, Mr. Alvarez, on October 23,
2008, “we agree that there is no power” for the Federal Reserve “to hold AIG shares.”14
Moreover, as Board of Governors General Counsel Scott Alvarez later testified, there would
also have existed a conflict of interest if the FRBNY was both the lender and owner of AIG,
because “the owner and the lender don’t always have the same interest” ( Starr v. United
States and AIG 2015, 60).
Alvarez noted in an interview with the Yale Program on Financial Stability, however, that the
Fed authority to hold shares was not perfectly clear: “there is a good argument that we could
[hold the shares], we just didn't want to get to that bridge because there were a variety of
policy implications and other reasons” (YPFS 2018).15
Additionally, a draft memo written by the Fed’s Legal Division on September 17, 2008 notes
that the issue of whether a Reserve Bank could “acquire, hold, vote the equity securities it
obtains . . . does not need to be addressed at this time” (Legal Division 2008).
6.
The Trust was managed by three independent Trustees appointed by the
FRBNY in consultation with Treasury.
On January 16, 2009, the FRBNY, in consultation with Treasury, appointed three individuals
to manage the Trust. The Trustees were not involved in the decision to develop the Trust;
but were all seasoned professionals. Trustee Feldberg had worked at the FRBNY for 36 years;
Trustee Considine was a former member of the FRBNY’s board; and Trustee Foshee was the
sitting chair of the board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas while a Trustee
(Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 30).
In a joint statement before a House Committee, the Trustees noted that the use of a trust was
“viewed by Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department as a way to place the
government’s interest in AIG in the hands of experienced individuals who could act without
risk of conflicts of interest that would be present if such controlling interest was held by the
FRBNY or the Department of the Treasury” (HOGRC 2009, 77)
_____________________________________________________________________
14

However, Baxter also testified that he did not remember claiming such and that a statement that the Fed
could not own shares “is not consistent with my views” (Zajac 2014).
See page 18 for discussion of a concurring opinion by Justice Wallach of the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals considering this issue (Starr v. United States and AIG 2017).
15
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FRBNY General Counsel Baxter also has stated that nominating three Trustees to run the
Trust rather than one acted as an “additional safeguard” for the oversight of AIG, one of the
world’s largest insurance companies (US Court of Federal Claims 2014, 937).
7.

The Trustees managed the Trust independently, subject to certain limitations.

The purpose of the Trust was to serve as the shareholder of the Trust Stock “for the sole
benefit of the Treasury” and to provide returns for “the American people”; any Trust assets
transferred to Treasury would be transferred directly to Treasury’s General Fund (FRBNY
2009a, 2). The Trustees were to exercise the rights of the Trust Stock, receive dividends, and
participate in shareholder meetings and votes in place of the FRBNY, but not for the benefit
of the Treasury and taxpayer (FRBNY 2009a, 6–8).
Moreover, to avoid “conflicts and legal impediments that could arise from either the US
government or the FRBNY exerting control over the world’s largest insurer,” the Trust
provided that the three Trustees would independently manage the Trust and oversee the
Trust Stock (FRBNY 2010a). The Trust Agreement states that since the Trust aims “to avoid
any possible conflict with its supervisory and monetary policy functions, the FRBNY does not
intend to exercise any discretion or control over the voting and consent rights associated
with the Trust Stock” (FRBNY 2009a, 2).
Prior to the creation of the Trust, the Trustees sent a memorandum to FRBNY General
Counsel Baxter pointing out that there was a potential conflict between the goals described
in Section 2.04(d) of the Trust Agreement ( Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 31). The
Trustees were expected to maximize AIG’s ability to repay advances under the Credit
Agreement, but they were also expected to avoid disrupting financial market conditions in
the “best interests of the stockholders of the Company.” The government later clarified that
the two goals were “non-binding” on the Trustees’ discretionary power to vote the Trust
Stock ( Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 31).
Trustee Feldberg testified that “the three-Trustee model . . . expects us to act through a
consensus, and to the maximum extent possible to act in unanimity” (HOGRC 2009). Mr.
Feldberg stated that the Trust provided “a mechanism so that if we cannot agree, two of the
three trustees could go forward” (HOGRC 2009).
The Trustees were to use their own discretion in managing the shares and exercising the
powers and rights of the preferred stock held by the Trust (FRBNY 2009a, 2). As
shareholders, they voted to elect directors. Trustees did not attend AIG Board meetings but
they did have regular discussions with senior management, board members, and Federal
Reserve and Treasury officials (HOGCR 2009).16

_____________________________________________________________________
16

In contrast to the Trustees’ lack of attendance at AIG board meetings, former AIG CEO Ed Liddy testified
before Congress that representatives of the Federal Reserve attended nearly every meeting (HOGRC 2009).
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Additionally, there were still some limitations on the Trustees’ independence. According to
the Trust Agreement, before selling or disposing of the Trust Stock, the Trust required
approval from the FRBNY, which would consult with Treasury (FRBNY 2009a, 8– 9).
The Trust was mandated to provide the FRBNY various records, such as: “monthly custodial
reports; quarterly summar[ies] of significant actions (votes, consents, etc.); quarterly
reports summarizing the efforts and activities to effect the sale or other disposition of the
Trust Stock or other Trust Assets; minutes of any meetings of the Trustees; and the
Divestiture Plan, as amended from time to time” (FRBNY 2009a, 17–18).
8.

The Trust was tasked with creating a Divestiture Plan for the Trust Stock.

To recoup the investment by the FRBNY and the Treasury, the Trust was tasked to create a
written Divestiture Plan to sell or otherwise dispose of the Series C preferred stock (FRBNY
2009a, 8). The Trust Agreement spelled out that the divestiture of the Trust Stock was to be
done in a value-maximizing manner. Furthermore, the sale or disposition of Trust Stock
could be completed only after the FRBNY was fully repaid for funds drawn under the RCF,
and after Treasury no longer owned any TARP-related preferred stock of AIG17 (FRBNY
2009a, 18). Even with a Divestiture Plan, the Trustees could only sell or dispose of any stock
after the FRBNY, in consultation with Treasury, granted approval to the Trust. (FRBNY
2009a, 8). As far as we have been able to discern, the Divestiture Plan was never completed
or executed upon since Treasury took over the sale of the Trust Shares.
9.

The Trust Agreement provided an exit plan.

The Trust Agreement provided that the Trust would terminate upon the earlier of “(i) the
sale or other disposition of all of the Trust Stock [including any common stock received on
conversion, which could only occur after repayment and termination of the RCF] such that
no Trust Stock continues to be held in trust hereunder; or (ii) the Company shall have been
liquidated and shall cease to exist or a plan of reorganization or liquidation shall have been
confirmed and consummated providing for no distribution in respect of the Trust Stock”
(FRBNY 2009a, 21). Thus, from its inception, the Trust Agreement anticipated two different
outcomes: one where the rescue was successful and the Trustees followed their mandate to
transfer the Trust Stock to the Treasury, and a second that likely would have been the result
of failure of the intervention.
On January 14, 2011, a Master Transaction Agreement, effectuating the Recapitalization
Plan, was entered into by AIG (and certain related entities), the FRBNY, the Treasury, and
the Trust (FRBNY 2010c). The agreement and plan provided for the repayment of all
amounts owed to the FRBNY pursuant to the RCF and for the RCF’s termination. Following
the termination of the RCF, the Trustees converted the Trust Stock and transferred the
resulting common stock to the Treasury General Fund (FRBNY 2011). As discussed, this had
_____________________________________________________________________
The preferred stock references mentioned here refer to the more senior Series D preferred stock (later
Series E preferred stock) and Series F preferred stock that Treasury acquired through the AIG Investment
Program; see Buchholtz and Lawson 2021b for further discussion.
17
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the effect of dissolving the Trust and terminating the Trust Agreement (FRBNY 2009a, 21).
The Trust Agreement also provided that any additional funds held in the Trust’s deposit
account as well as any other assets (or the proceeds thereof), were also to be transferred to
the Treasury (FRBNY 2009a, 21).

III. Evaluation
The AIG Credit Facility Trust was arguably successful in protecting the interests of American
taxpayers and the US government. The Trust held the Trust Stock for almost two years,
utilizing the “rights, powers, authorities, discretions, and duties” attached to the shares,
specifically the voting powers, until January 2011 (FRBNY 2009a, 5; Webel 2017, 15). The
Trust helped to elect new AIG Board members, resulting in a largely board that replaced the
board that had overseen the firm’s troubles (Starr v. United States and AIG 2012 , 48).
During a May 2009 HOGRC hearing on the structure and role of the Trust, Congress
expressed a number of concerns about the government’s intervention and relationship with
AIG. Among these were a request for more transparency, clarification on whether the goal of
serving a public purpose was being met, and concern whether the US taxpayer investment
in AIG was adequately protected (HOGRC 2009).
The Trustee structure was also criticized by some legislators caused some representatives
to question the Trustees’ independence. They pointed to the reports that the Trust was
required to provide o the FRBNY and were also very critical of the access that the FRBNY had
to AIG Board meetings, which the Trustees did not attend (HOGRC 2009).
The Trustees said that they were not accountable to the FRBNY but consulted with FRBNY
officials on significant issues (HOGRC 2009).18 (Moreover, the FRBNY had a team of about
15 officials stationed at AIG full-time to monitor developments and keep FRBNY
management and the Trustees informed.) The Trustees also repeatedly emphasized that
they were acting on behalf of the US taxpayer. Trustee Douglas Foshee even went as far as to
say that, “[We], as trustees, [are] more than happy to put our reputational risk in front of this
committee and act on behalf of the US taxpayers” (HOGCR 2009).
_____________________________________________________________________
For example, this exchange: “Mr. Kucinich. So would it be fair to assume that the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York has a significant role in monitoring the work of the trustees?
Mr. Feldberg. Yeah. I would say that they have a significant interest in the work of the trustees.
Mr. Kucinich. Are you trustees on behalf of the Federal Reserve Bank or are you trustees on behalf of the US
Treasury?
Mr. Foshee. We're trustees on behalf of the trust that holds the 79 percent equity on behalf of the US Treasury.
Mr. Kucinich. And then can you explain to this committee then why do you respond to the Fed, why is this
trust agreement structured so that your accountability is to the Fed?
Ms. Considine. I don't think that's the reading that I would give to it, because No. 1, in terms of visibility of
our responsibility, our responsibility is to act as the shareholder, and that is to vote the shares . . .. As part of
the agreement, yes, we are to provide minutes and of course expenses back to the Fed. But we were selected to
be totally independent trustees, and I believe that's the way we function” (HOGRC 2009).
18
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During the hearing, Professor J.W. Verret, an assistant professor of law at George Mason Law
School, also testified to discuss the flaws of the Trust and the Trust Agreement and why the
government should be careful in using the Trust as a model for other trusts in the future
(HOGRC 2009). Specifically, Verret singled out provisions that provided protections against
liability for each of the Trustees; he considered the indemnity and immunity provisions too
generous. (HOGRC 2009, 2).
A May 2010 Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) hearing concluded that the government
used a trust structure to manage the Trust Stock not only to avoid conflicts of interest, but
also “so as to not violate the Government Corporation Control Act . . . which prohibits the
government from owning a corporation without specific Congressional authorization” (COP
2009, 71). The COP concluded that the Trust played two roles that benefited Treasury and
the shareholding taxpayers: the role as shareholders “who want to maximize the return on
their investments” and the role as taxpayers “who want the financial system stabilized” (COP
2009). COP member J. Mark McWatters posited that the utilization of a trust structure to
manage the Trust Stock “may prolong the disposition process and appear to make
government-sponsored bailouts somehow more palatable to the taxpayers” (COP 2010,
296).
Although the Trust had the capability of ensuring that AIG had a responsible, independent,
and effective board of directors, the question remained whether changing AIG’s board and
nominating new members had any tangible effect on the company. Nicola Sharpe, Professor
of Law at the University of Illinois, College of Law, has argued that it hasn’t (Sharpe 2011,
107):
“…While having trusted representatives such as the AIG trustees elect skilled and
respected board members may pacify the public and appear to protect the large
federal investment in the 500 or so corporations it has bailed out, it does not solve
the problem of inadequate board monitoring as a contributing factor in corporate
ruin and, in fact, creates additional regulatory challenges.”
Some suggested that there may have been cause for regulatory concern over the lack of
supervision of the Trustees in this respect, given that they were mandated to act
independently (Davidoff 2009). There were arguments that there was nothing stopping
them, as independent trustees, from acting improperly (though they had not done anything
at this point to warrant such concerns), electing unqualified board members or members
that they have pre-existing relationships with “so long as their decisions are not contrary to
the interests of the government” (Davidoff 2009). The sole limitations for this role were to
elect “only persons who are not, and have not been within one year of their nomination,
officers, directors, or senior employees of the FRBNY or the Treasury Department,” which it
fulfilled (FRBNY 2009a). Otherwise, the Trustees were required only to act in or not against
Treasury’s interests and to use their best judgment when making decisions concerning the
Trust Stock. However, the indemnity clauses and protections in the Trust Agreement and the
Master Transaction Agreement protected the Trustees from further audit, liabilities, or
damages at the termination of the Agreements on January 14, 2011 (FRBNY 2009a, 13).
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Despite the work that went into its design, the equity kicker and the Trust were challenged
in court by one of AIG’s largest shareholder, Starr International. The Claims Court ruled for
the plaintiff finding an illegal extraction but awarding no damages. In his opinion Justice
Wheeler looked through the Trust to find that the FRBNY controlled the rust, which he held
not to be independent.19 This decision was overturned by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals which found that Starr did not have standing to bring the lawsuit because its claims
belonged to the company and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to grant cert in March of 2018
(SCOTUS 2018).
The lower court decision was vacated so it does not have precedential value, however, in its
vacated decision, the Claims Court expressed the opinion that the creation of the Trust to
hold the shares was not sufficient to avoid the finding of an illegal exaction because the trust
was not truly independent. Factors cited in support of this finding included that it had been
established by the Fed, that the “independent” trustees were appointed by the Fed and had
close affiliations to the Fed, and that during the Trust’s existence there were close
communications between the Fed and the Trust. (Wheeler 2015, 62-63). These conclusions
were rendered moot when the case was overturned and vacated by the Court of Appeals.
Additionally, Justice Wallach of the appellate court, writing in a concurring opinion, would
have found that government’s actions were authorized (and therefore could not be the basis
of an illegal exaction claim) because Section 13(3), read together with Section 4(4)’s
incidental powers provision, does not prohibit the taking of equity as the term of a loan.
(Starr v. United States and AIG 2017, 14-22).
It is also worth noting that in a related case brought by Starr against the FRBNY (Starr v.
FRBNY 2012,) the district court, in considering the FRBNY’s motion to dismiss, found the
opposite of the Federal Claims Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Engelmayer,
determined that the FRBNY had not breached its fiduciary duty to AIG under Delaware
corporate law because no such fiduciary duty existed since the FRBNY (1) did not control
AIG as a majority shareholder, nor (2) did it exercise actual control over the company. In
reaching its decision the court pointed to several provisions of the Trust Agreement
supporting this conclusion including provisions (i) giving the Trustees “absolute discretion
and control over the Trust Stock including how to exercise the voting rights, (ii) limiting the
Trustees ability to elect FRBNY affiliates to the AIG board, and (iii) stating that the Trustees
were not relieved from exercising their independent judgement despite receiving
information from the FRNY. (Starr v. FRBNY 2012, 9-10).20
_____________________________________________________________________
“The trustees were the ‘protectors of the Federal equity stake in AIG’. . . The manner in which FRBNY
controlled AIG with its handpicked CEO, carefully selected board members, and its hundreds of on-premises
advisers belies any conclusion that the operations of the trust were independent.” (Starr v. United States and
AIG 2012, 63).
20 The court also held that Delaware fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal law as upholding it would
have interfered with FRBNY performing its duties. (Starr v. FRBNY 2012,). The decision was upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (See Walker 2014).
19
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V.

Key Program Documents

Summary of Program
Actions Related to AIG (Accessed 02/2018) – Summary page on FRBNY website regarding
AIG interventions. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/actions-related-aig
AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement (01/16/2009) – Agreement that established the AIG
Credit Facility Trust as announced in the Credit Agreement and the responsibilities and
powers of the Trustees.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_AIG_Credit_Facility_
Trust_Agreement_20090116.pdf
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June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit
Strategy (06/10/2010) – Congressional Oversight Panel report on AIG’s rescue, highlighting
hearing testimonies, government actions, and impacts of government intervention.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4354
Implementation Documents
Agreement to Amend Warrants (01/14/2011) – Agreement among AIG, the AIA SPV, the
ALICO SPV, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Treasury, and AIG Credit Facility Trust to
issue warrants to purchase common stock from November 25, 2008 (Securities Purchase
Agreement) and April 17, 2009 (Securities Exchange Agreement).
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Agreement_to_Amend_
Warrants_20110114.pdf
AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement (01/16/2009) – Agreement that established the AIG
Credit Facility Trust as announced in the Credit Agreement, as well as the responsibilities and
powers of the Trustees.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_AIG_Credit_Facility_
Trust_Agreement_20090116.pdf
AIG Form 8-K (SEC, 09/30/2010) – AIG material definitive agreement submitted to the SEC
describing the Recapitalization Plan for repayment to the FRBNY for loans under the Credit
Facility. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Form_8K_20100930.pdf
AIG Schedule 14C (SEC, 12/07/2010) – AIG statement filed to the SEC describing the terms
to the upcoming Recapitalization Plan, as well as information on the Government Repayment
Committee and the Agreement in Principle.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Schedule_14C_2010120
7.pdf
Certificate of Elimination (01/14/2011) – Certificate that eliminates all of US Treasury’s
Series C preferred stock after converting it to common stock, as listed in the Master
Transaction Agreement.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Certificate_of_Eliminati
on_Series_C_Preferred_Stock_20110114_0.pdf
Credit Agreement (09/22/2008) – Document that authorized the extension of an $85 billion
revolving credit facility from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to AIG and listed the
terms of the facility.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Credit_Agreement_2
0080922.pdf
Credit Agreement, Amendment No. 2 (11/09/2008) – Amendment that alters the terms of
the preferred stock related to the Credit Agreement, reducing the voting rights of the 100,000
shares of Series C Preferred Stock from 79.9% to 77.9% following the issuance of a Series D
warrant allowing for the purchase of 2% of common stock.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Amendment_No._2_t
o_Credit_Agreement_20081109.pdf
Master Transaction Agreement (12/08/2010) – Agreement among AIG, the ALICO SPV, the
AIA SPV, Federal Reserve Bank, Treasury, and AIG Credit Facility Trust over the closing of the
Recapitalization Plan announced on September 30, 2010. The agreement highlights the
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completion of repayment transactions of the Credit Facility, the conversion of US Treasury
preferred stock to common shares, the repurchase of preferred shares in SPVs by AIG, the
termination of the AIG Credit Facility Trust, and delivery of any other certificates, agreements,
or documents by all parties.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Master_Transa
ction_Agreement_20101208.pdf
Recapitalization Plan Summary of Terms (09/30/2010) – Document explaining the terms of
the full recapitalization of AIG and the effective termination of the Credit Facility through the
net proceeds received from AIA IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the sale of ALICO
to MetLife, Inc., as well as the repurchase of preferred shares in the AIA and ALICO SPVs by
AIG from the Federal Reserve. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3289
Registration Rights Agreement (01/14/2011) – Agreement between AIG and US Treasury
for the issuance by AIG of 1.655 billion shares of common stock to Treasury as part of
Recapitalization, through the common stock held by the Trust from the Credit Agreement and
the common stock converted from all other preferred stock Treasury received through
government aid packages to AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Registration_Rights_Ag
reement_20110114_2.pdf
Securities Purchase Agreement: Series D Preferred Stock (11/25/2008) – Purchase
agreement entered into by AIG and US Treasury to sell 4 million shares of Series D fixed-rate,
cumulative, perpetual preferred stock and a warrant to purchase 53.8 million shares of
common stock to Treasury for $40 billion under TARP’s Systematically Significant Failing
Institutions (SSFI) program.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Securities_Purchase
_Agreement_Series_D_Preferred_Stock_20081125.pdf
Series C Certificate of Designations (03/01/2009) – Document announcing the intent to
issue 100,000 shares of Series C perpetual, convertible, participating preferred stock on March
4, 2009, in accordance with the Credit Agreement.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Certificate_of_Designati
ons_Series_C_Preferred_Stock_20090301_0.pdf
Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
(03/01/2009) – Purchase agreement entered into by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and AIG for the 100,000 shares of Series C stock issued through the Certificate of Designations
filed on March 1, 2009. The issuance and purchase occurred on March 4, 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Series_C_Preferred_Sto
ck_Purchase_Agreement_20090301_0.pdf
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
Government Publishing Office. United States Code, Title 12, Banks and Banking. (2007) –
Statutory title governing emergency lending by the Federal Reserve.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/USCODE-2007-title12.pdf
Press Releases/Announcements
AIG Credit Facility Trust FAQ (02/21/2010) – FAQ released by the Federal Reserve that
answers common questions about the formation, purpose, and responsibilities of the AIG
Credit Facility Trust.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Credit_Facility_Trus
t_FAQ_20100221.pdf
Federal Reserve Board and Treasury Department announce restructuring of financial
support to AIG (11/10/2008) – Press release announcing a $40 billion investment through
TARP in AIG and changes to the Credit Facility including reduction of the RCF to $60 billion,
reduction of the interest rate, reduction of the commitment fee, and extension of the facility to
five years.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_FRB_and_Treasury_De
partment_announce_restructuring_of_financial_support_to_AIG_20081110.pdf
New York Fed Ends AIG Assistance with Full Repayment (01/14/2011) – Federal Reserve
Bank of New York announcement of termination of the financial assistance to AIG, after AIG
has fulfilled its repayment of the loans according to the Recapitalization Plan presented in
September 2010. The termination of the assistance also means the dissolution of the AIG Trust
and transfer of its equity interest in AIG to Treasury.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_FRBNY_Ends_AIG_A
ssistance_with_Full_Repayment_20110114_0.pdf
Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be held June 30, 2009 (06/05/2009) – AIG
Board of Directors proxy statement notifying shareholders to of the details and proposals of
the upcoming annual shareholder meeting.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Proxy_Statement_Notic
e_of_Annual_Meeting_of_Shareholders_20090605.pdf
Statement by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Regarding AIG Transaction
(09/29/2008) – Statement on federal aid to AIG explaining the purpose of the loan, and
intent to stabilize AIG while maximizing value for taxpayers.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Statement_by_the_F
RBNY_Regarding_AIG_Transaction_20080929.pdf
Statement Regarding Establishment of the AIG Credit Facility Trust (01/16/2009) – FRBNY
announcement of the AIG Credit Facility Trust has been established for the sole benefit of the
United States Treasury and will hold the 77.9% equity interest in AIG related to the AIG Credit
Facility.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Statement_Regardin
g_Establishment_of_AIG_Credit_Facility_Trust_20090116.pdf
Treasury Announces the Completion of AIG’s Recapitalization (01/14/2011) – Treasury
announcement that AIG’s Recapitalization Plan is complete, the Credit Agreement has been
terminated, and the AIG Credit Facility Trust has been dissolved. Also, Treasury now owns
92% of the company after the conversion of Treasury’s and the Trust’s preferred stock to AIG
common stock.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Treasury_Ann
ounces_Completion_of_AIG_Recapitalization_Transaction_20110114_0.pdf
Treasury to Invest in AIG Restructuring Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(11/10/2008) – Press release announcing the purchase of $40 billion in Series D senior
preferred stock through TARP to help pay down existing loans of the Credit Facility.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Treasury_to_I
nvest_in_AIG_Restructuring_Under_EESA_20081110_2.pdf
Treasury Sells Final Shares of AIG Common Stock, Positive Return on Overall AIG
Commitment Reaches $22.7 Billion (12/11/2012) – Treasury announcement that it has
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conducted its final IPO of AIG common stock, realizing an overall positive return of $5 billion
on the equity interest in AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Treasury_Sells
_Final_Shares_of_AIG_Common_Stock_Positive_Return_Reaches_$22.7_Billion_20121211_0.
pdf
US Government Provides Support for Continued Restructuring of AIG (03/02/2009) – AIG
press release announcing restructuring plan to reduce debt owed to the government and the
intent to establish two special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for AIA and ALICO and the issuance of
preferred stock within each for the Federal Reserve, which will invest $26 billion in the SPVs.
The amount of the Credit Facility is also drawn down to $35 billion.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Press_Release_U.S._Gov
ernment_Provides_Support_For_Continued_Restructuring_Of_AIG_20090302_1.pdf
US Treasury and Federal Reserve Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan
(03/02/2009) – Joint press release announcing a restructuring plan for AIG which includes
investing in two special purpose vehicles for AIG subsidiaries AIA and ALICO, the removal of
the interest rate floor on the Credit Facility, and the issuance of Series C Preferred Stock from
the Credit Agreement.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_US_Treasury_and_FRB_
Announce_Participation_in_AIG_Restructuring_Plan_20090302.pdf
Media Stories
Short-Term Solutions to Long-Term Problems (New York Times – 03/26/2009) – Steven M.
Davidoff, known for his legal work on takeovers and corporate law, describing some of the
problems with the government’s approach in programs and interventions during the financial
crisis, specifically with AIG and Citigroup.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/NYT_ShortTerm_Solutions_to_Long-Term_Problems_20090326.pdf
Three Trustees of A.I.G. Are Quiet, Perhaps to a Fault (New York Times – 04/19/2009) –
News article discussing the goals of the AIG Credit Facility Trust and their role in acting as the
beneficiary of Treasury’s shares in AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/NYT_3_Trustees_of_AIG_Are
_Quiet_Perhaps_to_a_Fault_20090419.pdf
Key Academic Papers
Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis (Sharpe, 06/2011) –
Essay discussing corporate governance issues in the wake of government involvement at the
board level of rescued firms.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Sharpe_Journal_of_Business
_and_Technology_Rethinking_Board_Function_in_the_Wake_of_the_2008_Financial_Crisis_2
01106.pdf
Reports/Assessments
AIG 10-Q (SEC, 06/30/2009) – AIG Q2 2009 financial filing to the SEC stressing that it posted
its first profit since Q3 2007, six straight quarters of losses.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Form_10Q_20090630.pdf
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House Oversight and Government Reform Committee: AIG Collapse, Rescue, Trustees
(05/13/2009) – Transcript of a hearing of the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee, where the three trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust and J.W. Verret, a
Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, testified to the Committee about
the role, responsibilities, and intent of the Trust associated with government financial
assistance to AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_House_Committee_on_O
versight_and_Government_Reform_AIG_Where_is_the_Taxpayers_Money_Going_20090513.
pdf
June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit
Strategy (06/10/2010) – Congressional Oversight Panel report on AIG’s rescue, highlighting
hearing testimonies, government actions, and impacts of government intervention.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4354
Starr International Co. v. United States and American International Group, Inc. (United
States Court of Federal Claims, 06/15/2015) – Opinion and order from the Court of Federal
Claims stating that the government did conduct an illegal exaction of AIG, but zero damages
are awarded as there were no economic consequences to shareholders as a result of actions.
Without the government’s assistance in the first place, the value for shareholders would have
been worthless.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Court_of_Federal_Claims
_Opinion_of_Justice_Wheeler_20150615_1.pdf
Starr International Co. v. United States and American International Group, Inc. (United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 08/25/2015) – Starr International Co. files
its opening brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, appealing the
decision of the US Court of Federal Claims in June 2015.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Court_of_Appeals_for_th
e_Federal_Circuit_SICO_Plaintiffs_Appeal_20150825.pdf
Starr International Co. v. United States and American International Group, Inc. (United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 05/09/2017) – Opinion filed by Chief Judge
Reyna and Circuit Judge Wallach on the lawsuit filed by Starr International Co. against the US
government on its acquisition of equity interests in AIG and the actions related to a reversestock split at the 2009 annual shareholder meeting.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Court_of_Appeals_for_th
e_Federal_Circuit_Opinion_by_Reyna_and_Wallach_20170509.pdf
Statement of the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility before the House Oversight Committee
on Collapse and Federal Rescue of AIG (05/13/2009) – Statement from the three trustees of
the AIG Credit Facility Trust to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, prior
to their attendance to the hearing on May 13, 2009, reciting their responsibilities and
supporting the idea that the financial assistance to AIG is protected by the use of a trust.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Credit_Facility_Trust_St
atement_of_the_Trustees_before_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Refor
m_20090513.pdf
The Use of TARP Funds in Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive
Industry (Congressional Oversight Panel, 09/09/2009) – Report from the Congressional
Oversight Panel’s describing the TARP support provided to General Motors and Chrysler,
where the Panel reflects on some of the decisions made with AIG and how to make similar
programs or designs as the government continued to support the automotive industry.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Congressional_Oversight_Pa
nel_September_2009_Report_20090909.pdf
J.W. Verret Testimony before the House Oversight Committee Concerning the AIG Trust
(05/13/2009) – Testimony to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
presenting three flaws in the AIG Trust Agreement.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Verret_Testimony_before_H
ouse_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_20090513.pdf
Written Testimony of Herbert M. Allison Jr., Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability,
Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee
(12/17/2009) – Written testimony to the House Subcommittee of the Oversight and
Government Reform Committee describing the objectives the government wishes to achieve in
exercising its shareholder’s rights in AIG.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Allison_Jr_Testimony_befor
e_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform_20091217.pdf
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Appendix A: Timeline
September 16, 2008:

The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, with the support of
the US Treasury, authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (FRBNY) to make an $85 billion emergency credit line
available to American International Group, Inc. (AIG) to
prevent AIG’s failure by providing sufficient liquidity and
“make appropriate dispositions of certain assets over time.”

September 22, 2008:

AIG and the FRBNY sign the Credit Agreement and Guarantee
and Pledge Agreement that implements the Revolving Credit
Facility (RCF), with a maturity date of September 22, 2010. The
Agreement also provides that AIG will sell 100,000 shares of
Series C Preferred Stock, convertible into 79.9% of AIG’s
common stock (the Trust Stock), to an independent trust to be
created for the sole benefit of the US Treasury.

November 10, 2008:

AIG and Treasury agree in principle, under the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP), for Treasury to purchase $40 billion in
newly issued Series D Preferred Stock and a warrant to
purchase 2% of AIG’s common stock outstanding.

November 25, 2008:

The second amendment to the Credit Agreement is
implemented, and the Series D Warrant is sold to Treasury,
effectively reducing the Trust Stock equity stake to 77.9%. The
amendment also notes that AIG common stockholders will vote
as a separate class on first proposal to issue new common
shares.

January 16, 2009:

The FRBNY announces the establishment of the independent
AIG Credit Facility Trust (the Trust), headed by three
appointed trustees, which will hold the Trust Stock.

March 1, 2009:

AIG files a Certificate of Designations agreeing to issue the
Trust Stock to the Trust.

March 4, 2009:

AIG and the Trust agree to a Securities Purchase Agreement,
pursuant to which AIG will sell the Trust Stock to the Trust in
exchange for a $500,000 consideration.

June 30, 2009:

The AIG Annual Meeting of Shareholders takes place, where
common stockholders vote down the increase in the number of
authorized AIG common shares. However, a vote approving a
1:20 reverse stock split passes, providing the shares needed to
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allow the Trust, and Treasury, to convert their preferred stock
into AIG common stock.
September 30, 2010:

Treasury, the FRBNY, and the Trust announce an agreement on
a comprehensive Recapitalization Plan (the Plan) for AIG
designed to recoup all loans by the US government, including
all loans under the RCF, and to end the ownership relationship
between the government and AIG.

December 8, 2010:

AIG, the two special purpose vehicles (SPVs)—ALICO Holdings
and AIA Aurora LLC—the FRBNY, Treasury, and the Trust
enter into a Master Transaction Agreement based on the terms
set in the Plan. The Plan involves AIG’s repaying any remaining
debt under the RCF, the conversion of the Trust’s and
Treasury’s preferred stock into AIG common stock, and the
transfer of the common stock received by the Trust on
conversion to Treasury, resulting in the dissolution of the
Trust.

January 14, 2011:

The FRBNY announces that AIG has completed the repayment
of all loans provided by the RCF and that the Credit Agreement
is subsequently terminated. Treasury exchanges its $49.1
billion of Series E and Series F TARP-related preferred stock
into AIG common stock. The Trust also converts the Trust
Stock into AIG common stock and transfers the stock over to
Treasury’s General Fund, thereby dissolving the Trust.
Treasury’s overall ownership in AIG rises to roughly 92.1%.

December 10, 2012:

Treasury sells the last of its ownership stake in AIG in its sixth
and final offering of AIG common stock, netting more than $51
billion in gross cash proceeds. Proceeds amounting to $17.6
billion came from the AIG common stock received by the Trust
upon conversion of the Trust Stock.
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